Action research PhD

Gerry Roberts   -- Chapter 4

 

 

 

Action researching my practice as a facilitator of experiential learning with pastoralist farmers in Central West Queensland

 

 Gerard Michael O’Brien Roberts

B.App.Sc.  (Rur.  Tech) (Hons); M.Sc.  (Wool and An.  Sc.)

 

 

Chapter 4 My engagement with propositional knowledge in the literature on learning

 

Section 4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I outline some of the propositional knowledge that informed my reflections related to Argument I presented in Chapter 1.  I follow this in Chapter 5 with reflections, observations and interpretations related to my field work in the light of the knowledge gained in Chapter 4, and the concepts developed as a result.

I follow the same logic relative to my second thesis argument in Chapters 6 and 7.  That is, relevant propositional knowledge drawn from the literature is presented in Chapter 6 and reflections, observations and interpretation of field work, and concepts developed subsequently are presented in Chapter 7.

My first thesis argument (Argument I) is related to my understanding of learning generally and experiential learning in particular.  In that argument I suggest that experiential learning provides a process by which I can facilitate the emergence of learning outcomes or change, in response to the thematic concerns of participants in groups, as well as developing learning outcomes or change about the difficulties that

arise in group functioning and the facilitator’s role.  My grasp of relevant propositional knowledge is based on my appreciation of the literature, but my experience in this case suggests the search for literature related to an applied project with an experiential learning focus is itself problematic.  It seems that practitioners in arenas where I expected to find relevant literature (applied situations in psychology, organisational change and development, and education) are less able or likely to conduct formal research because of the dynamic and complex nature of their working situations.  Toulmin (1996), Dick (1995), Kochendorfer (1994), Berlin and White (1992) and Martin (1989) all suggest this.  The suggestion is that since few practitioners conduct research and/or publish, there is a lack of literature based on field experience.  The initial training of practitioners appears to be a contributory factor insofar as it focuses on quantitative and theoretical research principles and practice rather than applied field research.  Wren, Buckley and Michaelsen (1994), Kochendorfer (1994), Dick (1993) and Ong (1989) refer to this mismatch in the training of management, psychology, education and organisational change and development practitioners.

In reviewing literature relevant to my interest in experiential learning with pastoralists I adopted the strategy of focussing my efforts on material related to the application of what is learnt by the learners.  As a result, in this chapter I discuss:

• learning how to learn and self-directedness in inquiry;
• levels of learning;
• higher level learning, its role in agricultural change and the usefulness of experiential learning in creating higher level learning;
• cognitive development and higher level learning;
• reflection, critical reflection and epistemic organisation as a part of experiential learning; and
• the requirement for authentic information in communication for learning.

 

The propositional knowledge developed in this chapter informed my formal thesis reflections related to argument one and which crystallised after the completion of field work and its ongoing cycles of reflection, interpretation and action.  The concepts that emerged in the formal reflection of thesis writing are dealt with dialectically with the literature of this chapter (Chapter 4) and other literature, in Chapter 5.  This is consistent with reporting an action research thesis and Perry and Zuber-Skerritt (1992) refer to "reflection in the thesis" in their description of the relationship between the core and thesis action research projects. It is also consistent with Dick’s (1993) structure for an action research thesis wherein outcomes emerge in reflection that involves a dialectic with the literature.

Besides being consistent with accepted structures, this chapter, together with those preceding it, fulfils another role. It provides the frames of reference (Schon and Rein 1994) or previous foundations of experience (Boud and Walker 1990) or knowledge constitutive interests (Habermas 1973) of a propositional nature, that contribute to my later interpretations in formal thesis reflection related to argument one of my thesis. These later interpretations are recorded in Chapter 5.

My interaction with the literature in this chapter is bounded by my decision to deal with learning from the perspective of its observable and reportable processes and outcomes.  Knowledge of other aspects of learning is expanding, for example as "right brain" function is acknowledged, understood and used (Edwards 1979; Buzan 1989) and as the understanding of personality relative to intuitive learning or knowing (Murphy 1992; Myers and Myers 1993) develops.  Learning other than through observable phenomena is, however, beyond the scope of my project and I will not comment on it further.  Within this boundary Section 4.2 begins discussion of the topics referred to earlier in this section.

 

Section 4.2 Learning how to learn and its link to self-directedness in inquiry

Learning how to learn is gaining increased support as the means of working with or inquiring into the changes needed in contemporary society.  Support for this statement is found in the fields of formal and adult education, agricultural education, psychology, organisational development, management and communication.  While learning how to learn is a natural human ability, in the context of these fields it means the explicit development of consciously avaliable learning capabilities.  It is the addition at least initially of consciousness of process to counter less effective but practised learning strategies.  That less effective strategies are in operation is referred to by Kolb (1984) in relation to experiential learning and by Argyris and Schon (1996) in relation to the foundation of action science.

Ingalls (1973) supports the relevance of learning how to learn when he submits that the rate of change in society raises questions about the viability of teaching to others all that is known.  Better he suggests, is to provide others with the means to learn for themselves so that they may learn what they need as they recognise such needs.  The consequence he posits, is that learners take more responsibility for what they learn.  This concept of self-directedness is strongly supported by Burns (1995), Brookfield (1993) and Knowles (1984) in the field of adult education.

Rogers (1983) produced evidence that supports the notion that student-centred classrooms in formal education enable learning of a higher quality, pace and pervasiveness.  His material came from situations where the focus of the teacher was to facilitate learning how to learn by students so it is they who were making choices.  Gallagher (1994) develops a similar theme in the field of psychology.  He suggests that for ill-structured problems, teachers should help students build and link knowledge structures across domains "...  instead of simply providing more and more information (assuming that the learner is merely a sponge sopping up new facts)" (Gallagher 1994 p176).  This he contends will shift the focus of education to emphasise the processes of thinking itself.

Bawden (1988) writes of creating a learning environment that reflects the complexity of contemporary agriculture.  The learning environment should also provide for the development of competent agricultural technologists who know how to learn.  He argues (p151) that changes in the world require attention to "...  mastery of ways of finding out knowledge ..." as well as the development of new knowledge itself.  Pretty and Chambers (1994) support the concept of learning how to learn from an extensive practical and theoretical consideration of agricultural situations.  Burns’ (1995) ideas of adults at work also support the concepts of learning how to learn although cautioning that while learning how to learn is important for evolving situations, it will not replace other learning - but complement it where appropriate.  Revans (1984), writing about action learning and management, recognises the role of creating new knowledge and using already known (propositional) knowledge in problem solving.  These authors provide balance in relation to learning how to learn through recognising that learning how to learn is not the only type of learning needed.

Recognition of the need to provide adults with the ability to learn how to learn has extended beyond the fields of education and psychology.  Daudelin (1996) writes about organisational development.  She submits that providing only "content answers" for managerial problem resolution in organisations establishes a game of ‘catch-up’, and learning how to learn overcomes that difficulty.  Revans (1984 p16), arguing the same for management, states that "...  programmed knowledge ...  is quite insufficient for keeping on top of a world like ours today ..." and that the issues facing managers provide a focus for their learning. Similarly Daudelin (1996) suggests that the day-to-day problems confronting managers can provide the means for them to learn through reflection.  Daudelin (1996) and Revans (1984) continue the theme of self direction in learning, in this case focused by the real problems managers face.

In agriculture, Caldwell and Richardson (1995) have demonstrated that farmers preferred material presented in a way that allowed them to direct their attention to their preferred topics.  That is, extension methods that allowed for self directedness in the choice of topic focus and in timing and learning pace were recognised as primary by farmers.

Thus it seems that learning how to learn as an appropriate focus when providing people with skills to use with complex situations is supported by the experiences of these authors.  Their material comes form practical situations and their interpretations of theoretical concepts.  Dealing with complex situations has application generally as well as to agriculture.  Additionally, as argued by Gallagher (1994), Bawden (1990) and Ingalls (1973) it is learning how to learn that provides people with the ability to be self-directed in their life long practice of learning.  Hatcher (1997) provides a description of self-directed learning that clearly involves others, some of whom may be described as learning facilitators, but the learner knows how to learn and chooses learning directions.

Knowing how to learn provides an individual with abilities to adapt to changing circumstances (Kolb 1984) - a notion that Churchman (1971) refers to in his design of inquiring systems, as potential knowledge.

The core notion of my research project with pastoralists was consistent with these observations.  It was to have pastoralist farmers learn how to learn through acquiring skills in experiential learning.  My notion of having pastoralists know how to learn was to provide them with skills for their use in improving situations.  I found no literature that denied the role or relevance of learning how to learn.  However, the literature did not present learning how to learn as the only strategy for change. While the literature recognised the significance of learning how to learn, it emphasised the equal importance of propositional or programmed knowledge (available from others) and practical training in relation to learning (Revans 1984; Zuber-Skerritt 1993; Bawden 1995).  These were important considerations in the work being reported here. 

 

Section 4.3 Levels of learning

An important aspect of learning how to learn is that of ‘levels of learning’ and authors who have developed concepts related to this include Bateson (1972), Habermas (1973), Watzlawick et al (1974), Kitchener (1983), Mezirow (1991), Bawden (1995) and Argyris and Schon (1996).  A level of correspondence and contrast is evident amongst these authors in their discussion of these concepts.  An interpretation of their material is presented in Table 4.1.

 

Table 4.1 An interpretation of levels of learning made from the work of seven authors

Author	A First Level of Learning	A Second Level of Learning	A Third Level of Learning
Bateson (1972)	Learning I where the learner seeks knowledge to correct errors of choice within a set of alternatives.	Learning II where the learner seeks knowledge of the process of learning to provide for change in the set of alternatives from which to choose.	Learning III where the learner seeks knowledge for change in the process of learning II, i.e. change in the system of sets of alternatives.
Habermas (1973)	Determined by technical interest and involves the learner in seeking knowledge for control. (Making changes to achieve the desired end).	Determined by practical interests and involves the learner in seeking knowledge for understanding the conditions needed for their communications to attain meaningfulness.  (Developing understanding).	Determined by emancipatory interests and involves the learner in seeking knowledge about the effect of social, cultural or political conditions. (Including reflection on the context and their assumptions relating to that context).
Watzlawick et al (1974)	First-order change in which there is change within a system which itself remains unchanged.		Second-order change or one whose occurrence changes the system itself.
Kitchener (1983)	Cognitive processing or knowing (learning) about a subject or task etc (solving problems).	Metacognitive processing or monitoring progress in first order tasks.	Epistemic processing or reflecting on the certainty, limits and criteria of knowing.
Mezirow (1991)	Learning involves the learner in understanding an experience in terms of a previously held expectation or a meaning perspective.  It then involves the learner in "...sort(ing) through ...  the alternative interpretations currently available ...  in order to assess what is relevant." (P12)		Transformative learning involves the learner in reinterpreting an old experience or a new one from a new set of expectations.  Transformative learning results in transformed meaning schemes through assessing assumptions.  It results in transformation of a meaning perspective when reflection focuses on premises.
Bawden (1995)	Learning at a task level and in which the efficiency with which the task is completed successfully is the focus.	Meta-learning wherein learning is about how the learning at a task level is taking place.	Epistemic learning is learning about the relationship between the knower and what is known and takes the form of knowing the limits and nature of knowledge.
Argyris and Schon (1996)	Single-loop learning is instrumental learning.  It changes strategies to achieve the same end, ie the underlying values remain the same.		Double-loop learning provides for change in underlying values.  It involves change in strategies as well.

The authors cited here work in philosophy, adult education, formal agricultural education, mathematics, psychology and organisational development.

Bateson (1972), Habermas (1973), Watzlawick et al (1974), Kitchener (1983), Bawden (1995) and Argyris and Schon (1996) present similar notions about "first level learning" or learning about the matter to hand without conscious atttention to the particular learning strategy in use.  At this level learning provides for change to achieve the desired end, through varying the tactics employed.  In contrast Mezirow’s (1991) first level deals more with interpreting experience rather than referring to the learning that takes place.  He implies no change but infers an increase in understanding of new experiences in terms of already held worldviews.

At a second level Bateson (1972), Kitchener (1983) and Bawden (1995) present meta-learning as learning about the process of learning itself as it occurs at level one.  For example, learning about (improving) a situation at this level involves becoming aware through the experience, that we are unable to deal with a situation because of the strategy (the meta-cognitive process) we are using.

Habermas (1973) directs his attention to developing authentic communication amongst participants in a learning environment.  At a second level he seeks to understand the norms underlying interactions.  Learning at this level manifests itself for him as "Practical discourse ...  a procedure for testing the validity of norms that are being proposed and hypothetically considered for adoption" (Habermas 1992 p103).  Within my interpretation of levels of learning he is placing the accent on understanding what is happening among participants through making such understanding explicit to them.  This can be interpreted as an element of learning about how learning at level one is occurring through its examination of the norms that are acting to influence level one learning.

Mezirow’s (1991) concept of transformative learning is consistent with what I refer to as a third level of learning.  It again involves interpretation or reinterpretation of experience with the focus is on forming new sets of expectations, and within them new meaning schemes.  Each of the other six authors (Bateson 1972; Habermas 1973; Watzlawick et al 1974; Kitchener 1983; Bawden 1995 and Argyris and Schon 1996) refer to a level of learning consistent with the concept here of learning level three.  There is similarity between the change in sets of alternatives given as criteria by Bateson (1972), the second-order change of Watzlawick et al (1974) and within that the particularisation of the emancipatory interest of Habermas’ (1973).  The double loop learning of Argyris and Schon (1996) can be considered at this level because of its attention to the generation of alternatives from outside the existing category.

Bawden (pers comm) further suggests that the three ‘levels’ can be envisaged as a hierachy of systems of inquiry.  His concept expands the other authors’ perceptions of a third level of learning to explicitly embrace the field of systems thinking.

Grundy refers to emancipation in learning when discussing action research modes based on Habermas' categories of interest (Grundy 1982).  She highlights the importance of an emancipatory mode stating that "The emancipatory interest means to travel by a different path, rather than to arrive".  She provides for participants to reach an outcome by taking a path that illuminates the emancipatory aspects of their chosen situation (that is, their self-chosen direction for learning).  Brookfield (1993) raises a similar issue in relation to self-directed learning.  He suggests that it must include emancipation in its concepts and practice, to the extent of activities that draw the explicit attention of the learners in a situation to their emancipatory interests.  Such a theme is carried by Chisholm (1990) in the application of action research as a means of learning inquiry in education.  Her work suggests that without an emancipatory element to learning, a mainstream action research practice has evolved that does not engage with more recent interpretations of action research in its emerging emancipatory tradition.

Brookfield’s (1993) insistence on the inclusion of emancipation as an explicit aspect of learning suggests that outcomes that persist require the inclusion of aspects of personal and collective development, founded on emancipation in the terms described by Habermas (1973).  The outcomes otherwise, may be akin to what Brookfield (1993 p229) suggests can happen in self-directed learning situations in the absence of emancipation. He postulates "...  it is quite possible to advocate self-directed approaches in good conscience, only to discover that our efforts have served to bolster the oppressive structures that we thought we were opposing." Reports by Chisholm (1990) of mainstream action research and anti-sexist action research in education appear to support this possibility.  It is to counteract this that the ‘path’ approach of Grundy or the similar concept of ‘critical heuristics’ (Ulrich 1993) in systems practice, seeks emancipatory knowledge in inquiry.

The argument that there is a need for increased attention to emancipatory activities, finds parallels in the development of criticality as a feature of inquiry systems.  It is encountered for example with in the tradition of systems thinking and practice (Ulrich 1988; 1993), action research (Carr and Kemmis 1986) and systemic development (Bawden 1995).  The need for criticality is articulated cogently in the Frankfurt school of philosophy (Carr and Kemmis 1986; Webb 1996).  Criticality provides an opportunity to add the choices that may emerge when the people in the system are aware of what are the emancipatory interests in their situation.

The concept of levels of learning provides a framework for understanding interpretations of learning.  I find it useful to distinguish between the three levels of learning, each with a particular focus that provides a context for the other two.  The first level relates to choosing other ways of achieving the same end, within a set context.  The second level is learning within the context about the way in which the learning at a task level is being achieved.  The third is where alteration of values and worldviews occurs through development of insights into the nature of knowledge.  It is through engagement with this third or epistemic level that the ontological, epistemological and human nature assumptions mentioned earlier are surfaced and reflected upon.  Engagement at the third level enables a focus for significant alterations to how situations are understood and framed.  It is at this level that the significance of values in "lower order" decision-making becomes apparent.

Consciousness of the self is a feature of level three learning and this is consistent with Habermas’ (1973) emancipatory learning where he attends explicitly to the role of the self including reflection on the context and the learner’s assumptions about it that arise from the learner’s ontology, epistemology and human nature.

My interpretation of the literature presented in this section in relation to learning how to learn is that knowing how to learn at each level of the ‘learning hierarchy’ is important. Bateson (1972), Kitchener (1983) and Bawden (1995) have derived their theories of learning from cognitive processing and they detail learning for significant change in two stages recognisable as the shitfs between levels.  The two stages integrate the three levels of learning where stage one may be understood as initial awareness of an inability to improve a problematic situation because of the "way or ways" being used to address or learn about the situation.  If conscious action for change to the "way or ways" is taken at that stage it represents learning at a metacognitive level.  Stage two occurs when which awareness of the influence of the epistemological frameworks in which we are operating is brought into focus.  If conscious action for change to alter epistemic frameworks is taken at this stage, it represents learning at an epistemic-cognitive level.

In terms of the theoretical interpretations made by Bateson, Kitchener and Bawden, my use of Habermas’ (1973) work in the table is a particular "case" of learning at the three levels for emancipation.  That Habermas focuses on emancipatory learning is understandable because of his attention to critical theorist philolophy.

Again in terms of the theoretical interpretations made by Bateson, Kitchener and Bawden, my use of the concept of levels when considering the work of Watzlawick (1974), Mezirow (1981) and Argyris and Schon (1996) is based on their attention to change. Whereas Bateson, Kitchener and Bawden deal with the process of how change occurs, Watzlarwick, Mezirow and Argyris and Schon are concerned with the intended outcome.

I believe Level III learning is the key to altering how situations are understood and framed.  When I refer to higher level learning later in this thesis it is Level III learning to which I am referring, while recogniding that change in epistemic cognitive processing is accessed through meta-cognitive processing.  I chose experiential learning as a vehicle for accessing higher level learning to enable second order change in problematic situations in the project.

In the next section I refer to the desirability of higher level learning in agriculture, and to how experiential learning can be used to create higher level learning. 

 

Section 4.4 The desirability of higher level learning for agricultural change and the usefulness of experiential learning in creating higher level learning

It is increasingly recognised that agriculture is an immensely complex endeavour where situations exist in which there are no simple problems nor apparently suitable solutions.  Seeking improvements in such complex circumstances requires new ways of learning; a situation which extends beyond agriculture.  Literature relating to the domains of education and learning, cognitive development, psychology, design, organisational development, sociology, consulting, technology management and community development, provides support for learning as the response to complex situations.  The conclusion I develop in this section, based on literature from the domains referred to, is that learning as experiential learning offers access to higher level of learning as a foundation for changes (improvements) in complex issues.

Vanclay and Lawrence (1995) are among those who have written about the environmental imperative in Australian agriculture and the need to act or inquire differently into the industry’s complex problems.  Graetz (1994) too suggests that there is a need for change in the management of Australian agriculture.  He has reflected on the past to make a judgement of the fluctuating fortunes of the wool industry to illustrate his arguments.  He suggests that the wool industry is "...  but one example of the poverty of management that pervades much of landuse in Australia" (p244).

Bawden (1990) has argued the case for multiple worldviews in agriculture and rural development while emphasising the limitations of the prevailing positivist paradigm.  Webb (1996) suggests that challenging the positivist paradigm as the only one for thinking about society is what prompted critical theory development.  Pretty (1994) too submits that a positivist paradigm is but one of a number of frames through which to view the world. He emphasises the point that the existence of other paradigms and methodologies does not designate a need to choose one or other.  He suggests that

".....  we need to reform the way we think about methodologies for finding out about the world" (Pretty 1994 p39).

A similar message of integration of paradigms rather than choosing one or other when dealing with the complex issues of society is a significant point made by Parks (1997) in describing the role of humanistic psychology.  Both Parks (1997) and Pretty (1994) advocate that the context should determine the paradigm in which inquiry takes place and the methodology chosen and in so doing, reinforce the case for higher levels of learning.

The idea of context-dependent paradigm and methodology selection seem appropriate when issues that confront people can range from relatively simple production puzzles to the complexity of development paradoxes.  Ill-structured problems or paradoxes are ones for which there are opposing or contradictory evidence and opinion (Kitchener 1983; Churchman 1971).  Bawden (1990) proposes that experiential learning strategies are most appropriate for learning how to manage change and that this is particularly so for the complex or ill-structured problems such as we encounter in agriculture.  This proposal is supported from Kolb (1984 p32) who identifies experiential learning as "...the major process of human adaptation".

Of particular significance here is the influence of values as vital aspects of the governing variables or frames that direct the learner’s attention to desired ends in development (Argyris et al 1985; Schon 1983).  I referred to this earlier in the section on levels of learning.  Dick and Dalmau (1991) refer to governing variables as governing values.  Vickers recognises them as value judgements, which together with reality judgements combine to produce what he terms appreciative systems (Checkland and Casar 1986).  These appreciative systems provide the perspective from which individuals act when they encounter a situation and the combination of reality judgements and value judgements reflect choices about the way such situations should be encountered.  Thus changes in the governing values required for higher level learning involve change both in the apprehension of the concrete experience and in the way that values determine its conceptual comprehension.

Emerging issues of agricultural development emphasise the importance of access to different appreciative systems or paradigms because of the complexity of those issues.  Thus Fitzhardinge (1994) has made specific reference to complex problems in the rangelands of Australia - the area in which the pastoralists in this present project manage land.  He writes that our understanding of the resource is sound, but that we require a changed paradigm for maintenance of biodiversity and for sustainability or persistence as Bawden (1995) prefers.  Kersten and Ison (1994) suggest that ecological and social sustainability can emerge from valuing human diversity through operating in a constructivist paradigm that provides for co-researching relationships.  Fitzhardinge (1994), like Vanclay and Lawrence (1995), suggests that attention needs to shift in order to embrace aspects of the social system in the development of new approaches to the complex problems of rangelands.  Butler (1995) has reported similar complexity of issues and the need to change in the United States rangelands.  He has recognised the requirement for attention to the social system by particularising the necessity for understanding how communication occurs amongst decision makers of rangeland use.

Vanclay and Lawrence (1995) also argue for attention to be paid to the sociological aspects of such issues while submitting that current thinking patterns are inadequate to provide an understanding of the complex problems involved.  Campbell and Junor (1992) concur with this view.  They derive their argument from an examination of some programs that involved social elements and which led to landuse improvement in the Landcare movement.  At an applied level Stubbs et al (1997 p41) write that "Effective and efficient rural extension services demand specific competencies related to ...  communication and attitudinal skills, which may not be the same as those required by extension practitioners operating in the historic role of extension." In support of this they refer to their survey material showing practitioners, employers and clients of rural extension practitioners recognising the need for extension practitioners to have knowledge of the functioning of ‘rural families, communities and organisations’ and human behaviour.  These competencies are related to including sociological dimensions in agricultural extension practice and require a change in the ‘historic’ paradigm of extension.

But paradigms-cum-appreciative systems are very difficult to change.  Pretty (1994) recognises this when he posits that the positivist paradigm in agricultural development is "...  so pervasive that, by definition, those inside it cannot see that alternatives exist" (p38).  In educational research Melrose (1996) appears to have recognised this phenomenon.  To make researchers aware of it she developed a tool to self-assess between the paradigms of functionalism (positivism), transactionalism and criticalism.

Vanclay and Lawrence (1995) argue that extension agencies in agriculture have largely maintained attention on traditional paradigms focused towards technically framing the problematic situations.  Campbell and Junor (1992 p21) support this argument when they claim that "...  despite the limitations of the linear, one-way [diffusion] model [of extension], research and advisory structures are still largely based on it." The survey of required competencies for extension practitioners (Stubbs et al 1997) shows practitioner, client and employer recognition of the need for change.

The debate extends beyond agriculture.  Martin (1989) for instance, has suggested that in the field of clinical psychology a broadening of the range of methodologies available to practitioners is desirable if their practice is to benefit from their experience.  Yet there is considerable resistance to such a change.  Dick (1991) and Bish and Dick (1992) in seeking to increase access to other methodologies in a fourth year psychology program, found that others were not supportive because, "[As] An experiential and skills-oriented course, it sits a little uneasily within a traditional university [experimental science] psychology program" (Bish and Dick 1992).

Dearing (1993) has raised a similar issue in the field of technology management.  He refers to homophily or the degree to which people are alike and its positive effect on trust and acceptance.  Homophilites however, tend to be aware of the same information and a single paradigm tends to prevail.  It is heterophilites who are more likely to act differently to each other (Dearing 1993).  The significant issue where change is being sought is participation that allows involvement by those with alternative paradigms.  Espejo (1993 p517) supports participation in business development on the grounds that its absence is "... inhibiting a truly distributed response in which everyone is involved in creating their future ...  ".

Pretty (1994) too argues strongly for participation as central to the process by which people learn to deal with complex problematic situations in agriculture.  Participation is also a significant aspect of the method suggested for improved technology transfer by Gregory (1994).  Even Douglas (1996), who criticises the average woolgrower for allowing a lack of uptake of technology to leave them 50% behind possible productivity, includes increased participation by woolgrowers in research and development to change the level of adoption.  However while the other authors to whom I have referred place participation highly, Douglas (1996) places it fifth on a list of five key points. Through participation Douglas (1996), Pretty (1994) and Gregory (1994) seek to include the sociological dynamic of change. Pretty’s (1994) and Gregory’s (1994) reason for its inclusion is their belief that forms of inquiry founded on epistemologies other than the current most used one of positivism can yield information for use in agriculture that is agreed upon as relevant in the context of agriculture.

Experiential learning, although a personal process, can be used in social contexts to achieve "community learning".  The work of Macadam (1994) with agricultural communities in the Philippines and in Nepal (Macadam 1995) exemplifies this aspect.  Experiential learning has the potential for use in agriculture (Macadam 1994, 1995).  Through experiential learning, experiences can be shared and new abstract conceptualisations co-generated at all three levels of learning to create the dynamic and critical learning systems referred to by Bawden (1995).  In such situations experiential learning means groups of stakeholders learning their way through problematic situations together.

The matter of criticality is important here.  Lawrence et al (1992) have challenged the use of experiential learning in systems approaches to agriculture They have made the challenge in their advocacy of increased emphasis on sociology to improve difficult agricultural situations.  They argue that in prompting farmers to be the generators of their own futures (which experiential learning does) there are external structural forces that pre-empt success.  They claim that the self-discovery that experiential learning offers does not necessarily deal with other personal and family constraints.  They suggest that it lacks a political action focus and that it accepts current legitimacies.  Where there is inattention to the critical dimensions of experiential learning this is a significant critique.  Here Brookfield’s (1993) call for increased criticality in self-directed learning is relevant. It is his submission that adult education is lacking in promoting its potential for political action where there is an absence of criticality.  Such claims may have some validity in particular applications by specific users of experiential learning and this could have been the case in some aspects of my own project work. However, it seems open to question that they are present in the foundation of the experiential learning methodology.  One reason for this is the emphasis on participation practised by Macadam (1994; 1995) and Gamble et al (1995) that goes beyond only farmer involvement.  A second is the accent on criticality proposed by Bawden (1995) in his use of the experiential learning methodology from a systems perspective of self-referentiality.  A third is in the more recent writing of Kolb (Wolfe and Kolb 1991) that refers to an individual’s ability to influence external environmental factors of their lives through the process of experiential learning.  Here they mention particularly occupational and family circumstances.

Criticality is not an innate feature of the experiential learning process and its inclusion needs to be recognised and promoted.  Participation is important in this regard, particularly to enhance heterophilic communal involvement.  In such situations the exchanges between participants are based on shared experiences and shared meaning.  However, Argyris et al (1985), Argyris (1990), Dick and Dalmau (1991) and Argyris and Schon (1996) suggest that any change or higher level learning may rely on the exchange of valid information.  On that basis it seems that the literature largely supports experiential learning that includes participation and criticality as a means of developing higher level learning outcomes for change in complex agricultural situations.

Argyris and Schon (1996) and Dick and Dalmau (1991) have argued the need for valid information in the field of organisational development, where participation and shared learning play key roles in inquiry for higher level change.  The requirement for valid or authentic data "...  that resonates the life experience of the researched and researcher" is also the claim made by Hall (1996 p29) for emancipatory action research.  Similarly I suggest that if experiential learning is to prove sufficiently powerful to generate persistent change (Bawden 1995) and true participation (Pretty 1994) as an inquiry methodology in agriculture, it requires the exchange of authentic or valid information.  Argyris and Schon (1996) and Dick and Dalmau (1991) suggest that action science offers a perspective for delivering valid information.

The literature in this section highlights agriculture’s need to generate change in complex problematic situations, and that using paradigms of inquiry that suit the context will contribute to higher level learning outcomes or change.  It seems that experiential learning provides a means of developing relevant change and that attention to participation and criticality accommodates questions raised about its appropriateness.  A condition that may impact on the achievement or otherwise of change through experiential learning is access to valid information in exchanges.  This matter of validity is influenced by what might be termed positions or states of cognitive development, and it is to this that I now turn. 

 

Section 4.5 Cognitive development and higher level learning

In the previous sections I established the apparent benefit of higher level learning as a means of generating change related to complex farming issues.  I now consider literature related to the cognitive requirements for achieving higher level learning.  From the literature it appears that cognitive development contributes to what have been referred to as epistemic positions (Salner 1986) and that these influence an individual’s ability to develop and use higher level learning outcomes.

I concluded the previous section by making a point based on the work of Argyris and Schon (1996) that valid information used in experiential learning is a prerequisite for developing higher level learning related to improvement in complex agricultural situations.  The provision of valid information in the experiential learning process may not of itself lead to effective experiential learning because the acceptance of experiential learning as a means of learning may vary for different individuals.  Ellis and Kruglanski (1992) suggest that people will find experiential learning useful if they have a high self-ascribed epistemic authority for themselves.  That is, the people involved believe that their own learning outcomes are worthwhile in the situation. Others with a high perceived "authority-gap" would benefit more from an external ‘expert’ insofar as they believe that others in this situation hold knowledge that is more worthy than their own.  Ellis and Kruglanski (1992) are referring to the epistemic cognitive position individuals holds about the sources of improvement available for the situation confronting them.  Munby and Russell (1993) report a similar phenomenon in teacher training, where some trainee teachers wanted to be told how to act in the authority position of teaching and some did not.

Culver and Hackos (1982), Kitchener (1983), Salner (1986), Ranney (1987) and Bawden (1990) have each argued that epistemic positions significantly influence an individual’s inquiry approaches.  Salner (1986) and Ranney (1987) proposed ways to encourage epistemic cognitive development towards what Ellis and Kruglanski (1992) call high self-ascribed epistemic authority. Arguably Argyris et al (1985), Dick and Dalmau (1991) and Argyris and Schon (1996) have presented ways of promoting epistemic development as a basis for organisational development.  They did so through their attention to processes for the generation and exchange of valid information among participants in inquiry systems.  Bawden and Packham (1993) sought a similar outcome in the education of agriculturalists, in line with their anticipated need for agriculturalists to use critical systemic thinking in development activities.  They did this through utilization of experiential learning.

Given that epistemic development can influence the fullness of involvement in experiential learning it appears to be important to incorporate activities that promote cognitive development into experiential learning as promoted by Wolfe and Kolb (1991).

Cognitive development theorists propose that humans’ epistemic ways of interpreting the world change through experience with the world, and that this occurs through, ".....  basic transformations of cognitive structure ..." (Kohlberg 1969 p348). Kohlberg (1969), Perry (1970) and Piaget (1972) are among the theorists who have studied cognitive development.  Kohlberg (1969 p348) proposes that theories of cognitive development postulate a representational " ....  process intervening between stimulus and response." Vickers’ concept of appreciative systems (Checkland and Casar 1986) and the governing variables of Argyris and Schon (1996) are consistent with this notion of a mediation process between stimulus and response.

Merriam and Caffarella (1991) link basic transformations in cognitive structure to interactions between maturation and environment.  Gould (1972) maintained that mainstream cognitive theories propose the transformation occurs in phases or stages. The theories propose that the direction of development through stages is "...  towards greater equilibrium in the organism-environment interaction ..." (Kohlberg 1969 p348) or "... as outcomes of creative reorganisation of an existing cognitive inventory that is inadequate to the task of handling certain persistent problems" (Habermas 1992 p123).

The all-embracing validity of earlier cognitive development theories is however being questioned.  Questions relate to their predication upon interpretations based on predominately male development and use which is evident not only in the writing of cognitive development but also in fields like phonological and morphological speech patterns in management situations (Case 1993).  Gilligan (1982 p2) for example, in relation to development argues that "The disparity between women’s experience and the representation of human development, noted throughout the psychological literature, has generally been seen to signify a problem in women’s development.  Instead, the failure of women to fit existing models of human growth may point to a problem in the representation, a limitation in the conception of human condition, an omission of certain truths about life." Lugones and Spelman (1983 p578) raise the issue from a feminist perspective when they report that "Feminists have been quite diligent about pointing out the ways in which empirical, philosophical moral theories have been androcentric." Caffarella and Olson (1993) and Peck (1986) have also questioned male dominated studies or the interpretation of cognitive development of women by men.  The contentions made by these authors are supported in Gilligan’s (1982) data that shows the preponderance of males in cognitive development studies.

More recently, Merriam and Caffarella (1991) have posited that questions about cognitive development are revealing that evidence is emerging of further stages.  Caffarella and Olson (1993) in reviewing the literature of women’s psychosocial development expand this to embrace the idea of non-linearity of movement in relation to stages.  They are continuing a theme expressed by Peck (1986) of recognition of timing-of-events as the instigator of stages rather than only age-relatedness.

The presence of stages in development is however not questioned by these authors.  This is so even though the questioning of androcentricity appears soundly based and reasons for providing for attention to gender and other groupings in interpreting development are presented (Gilligan 1982; Lugones and Spelman 1983).  Support for stage-development is evident in the writing of Flavell 1982; Gilligan 1982; Peck 1986;

Hauser et al 1991; Merriam and Caffarella 1991; Habermas 1992; Caffarella and Olson

1993.  Even Courtenay (1994), who questions the role of adult development models in adult education, recognises that stages exist.  There is however evidence that non-linearity provides for interchange between stages in any direction (Merriam and Caffarella 1991; Peck 1986; Caffarella and Olson 1993).  Peck (1986) uses a spiral in her model to accommodate this.

While there are differences in definition and interpretation of cognitive development it appears useful to acknowledge that stages occur in some form and to link these stages to the way that individuals interpret the world.

The material of Wolfe and Kolb (1991) provides a review of the literature on cognitive development particularly relating to experiential learning.  Although lacking specific reference to female development, their summary supports my interpretation that stages occur.  As well, their review supports non-linearity (that is progression and regression).  Their interpretation also suggests that experiential learning can most usefully be a democratic learning process that, as Caffarella and Olson (1993) submit, allows for different cognitive development models.

Chisholm (1990) argues that it is a dualistic view of the world that is limiting action research in its effectiveness in sociological areas such as anti-sexist education and is making action research vulnerable to political actionism.  "In other words," she argues, "we have not succeeded in jumping out of a paradigm which can only encompass research as separated from praxis in the first place.  Action research is effectively engaged in trying to integrate what is, as a result of the [dualistically] way we look at the world, non-intergratable" (Chisholm 1990).  She appears to be suggesting that the gap cannot be bridged, but only recognised.

Salner (1986) links learning to stages in cognitive development and an individual’s views of the world.  Such a link may provide for the shift that Chisholm (1990) seeks for action research to take it away from a dualistic worldview that separates research and praxis.  Salner (1986) identified the necessity to develop an epistemological position of relativism before skills in systems studies could develop.  On that basis it seems that if double loop learning (Argyris and Schon 1996) is to alter frames of reference, then as Kitchener (1983) shows, cognitive positions of duality and multiplicity are inappropriate.  These positions foster single loop learning through dualism’s ‘one or other only’ approach and multiplicity’s ‘unlimited possible alternatives’ lack of criticality.  In Perry’s (1970 p177) work these two stages include ‘growth’ in which, ".....  a person may suspend, nullify, or even reverse the process of growth as our scheme defines it." That this occurs is understandable from Dick’s and Dalmau’s (1991) ideas of responses to dissonance ranging from denial through compartmentalisation and reinterpretation.  All of these constitute rejection of the possibility of change at some significant level. Wolfe and Kolb (1991) also recognise rejection of opportunities of higher level learning or change.

An interpretation from the foregoing is that higher level learning requires a cognitive position of an epistemology embracing relativism (Kitchener 1983; Salner 1986).  When this happens the situation is viewed from other perspectives to determine its relative context, thus making higher level learning possible.  To wait for this to develop ‘naturally’ (from the interplay of maturation and environment) for individual farmers may be inappropriate for an extension officer working with them.  Here Wolfe and Kolb’s (1991), Altrichter’s (1991) and Salner’s (1986) ideas are relevant.  They suggest that exposure to the skills of experiential learning will contribute to the development of the needed epistemological position.  There is support for this in a practical example by Oja and Smulyan (1989). They found that teachers exposed to different epistemological assumptions (held and expressed by others) and alternate ways of operating, progressed in recognisable cognitive development stages such as those elaborated by Perry (1970).  Acting to expose learners to different epistemological assumptions is consistent within the approach of Lewin (1946) in taking action to see what happens and reflecting on the action to learn about the situation. The likelihood is that the person encounters the situation of other epistemic positions and the encounter influences their epistemic position.  This is consistent with the concept of experiential learning where the non-holding of such an epistemic position does not preclude involvement in experiential learning. The reason that "non-holding" should not limit involvement is that the experience itself can generate the development of such a cognitive position.

There appears to be no significant body of literature that suggests that experiential learning cannot provide either the generation of higher level learning or the epistemic shift needed to accommodate higher level learning for change.  Indeed Henry (1989) refers to the plurality of understanding of experiential learning as a practice, but with that plurality centrally involving real-life experiences and reflection such that the potential of it is for ‘the development of higher cognitive goals’ that provide for the generalisation or transfer of learning.  A possible situation where experiential learning would not lead to cognitive development may arise in Ellis and Kruglanski’s (1992) reference to an authority gap where all problematic situations an individual faces are referred to an authority.  However, I have reported literature that suggests that involvement promotes epistemic development.  Smith and Berg’s (1995) emphasis on the need for psychological safety in the environment in which experiential learning occurs might also be construed as a challenge to experiential learning as a means of promoting cognitive development.  They maintain that psychological safety is the foundation upon which experiential learning in group settings takes place and suggest that without it, exploration of other ways of being will not occur.

In summarising this section on cognitive development and higher level learning I recognise a number of significant points.  The first is that higher level learning, from the perspective of experiential learning, represents change in the underlying assumptions made about a situation and that experiential learning provides for change in the perception (framing) of the situation. It can thus provide for possible outcomes that would deliver improvement.  A second is that to achieve change and improvement requires a cognitive epistemic position that allows for the existence of different frames.  Additionally it seems that the literature suggests that experiential learning can provide for shifts in cognitive epistemic positions.

A theme running through the literature on shifts in cognitive positions is that as situations arise, individuals think [reflect] on them to create new integrations [learning] (Kohlberg 1969; Perry 1970; Wolfe and Kolb 1991).  Wolfe and Kolb (1991) suggest that the opportunity for reflection is accommodated within the experiential learning process.  For that reason and because experiential learning is an integral part of my thesis, I refer in the next section to reflection in experiential learning as I continue to interact with the literature. 

 

Section 4.6 Reflection as a part of experiential learning

In this section I

• define reflection and identify the types to which I am referring;
• position the role of reflection in experiential learning through linking it to higher level learning;
• consider the calls being made for critical reflection, and
• consider an individual’s reflective capabilities in relation to their epistemic organisation.

 

Section 4.6.1 Defining reflection and identifying types of reflection

Boud et al (1985 p19) suggest that reflection is, "...  an important human activity in which people recapture their experience, think about it, mull it over and evaluate it." They suggest that reflection develops as a human capacity to different stages in different people.  Additionally they refer to the fact that it can be both an individual and group activity.  They also suggest that it is often lacking in learning situations.  In a practical setting of organisational development, O’Neil and Marsick (1994) refer to a general lack of reflective practice occurring in organisations.  Experimental evidence presented by Sterman (1989) on his work with managers also highlights its lack. He claims they were ‘insensitive’ to the feedback they received from their decisions.  Again with managers, Bunning (1996 p56) found that in an action researching project, they referred to the fact that they "...  had no time to sit around reflecting".  The lack of desire to engage in significant, meaningful reflection even as a part of action research, is now being recognised. Zuber-Skerritt (1996a) has reported it in organisational and staff development contexts and she suggests that lack of reflection will be a barrier to the development of learning organisations.

Mezirow (1991) has referred to the lack of attention to reflection in adult learning literature and he refers to a number of significant studies in which there is little or no mention of it.

Mezirow's (1991 p100) theory of transformative adult learning includes reflection as

"...  involving a review of the way we have consciously, coherently and purposefully applied ideas in strategising and implementing each phase of problem solving." His material refers, like that of Boud et al (1985), to the after-the-event activity of reviewing (reflecting) during an ‘hiatus’ in the action process.

Reflection of this type is an after-the-event activity or reflection-on-action.  Boud et al (1985), Habermas (1973) and Mezirow (1991) refer to it as such explicitly.  Bawden (1990, 1995), Schon (1983), Carr and Kemmis (1986), Brookfield (1987), and Oja and Smulyan (1989) do so by implication.  They do so in the way they offer their descriptions of what happens in activities that involve reflective learning.  Reflection-on-action requires time for learners to process their experiences before moving on and in that way attention focuses on the insights and the learning outcomes made from the experience (Boud and Walker 1990).

Schon (1983) has identified knowing-in-action (the action a practitioner or person takes in a situation) as a tacit form of knowledge and terms it as ‘know-how’.  He posits that "There is nothing in common sense to make us say that knowledge consists in rules or plans that we entertain in the mind prior to action" (Schon 1983 p51).  From that basis he develops the idea of reflection-in-action.  This is adjustments made by the practitioner while operating (practising their practice in Bawden's (1990) terms) to optimise their activities.  It thus happens within the context of the situation based on their accumulated knowledge.  He terms it ‘professional artistry’ and suggests practitioners display it as competence in dealing with, " ... unique, uncertain and conflicted situations of practice" (Schon 1987 p22).  Boud and Walker (1990) also recognise the concept of reflection-in-action generally.  Munby and Russell (1989) recognise reflection in a similar way for teachers where they note that it leads to an elevated level of professional knowledge.

Argyris et al (1985) and Mezirow (1991) propose the idea that reflection takes place whenever a person finds that strategies that they assumed would produce an outcome, fail to do so.  The idea of having strategies available, introduces the idea of planning as a type of reflection.  Dick (pers com) says that planning can be a form of reflection before an event.  He suggests it can lead to insights about the situation and the planner personally.  He also suggests that pre-event reflection can be based on questions about features of the situation, the outcomes being sought, and the action the planner expects will yield the desired outcome.  In a practical situation it moved planners from tacit understanding to conscious understanding.  Boud et al (1985a p9) also refer to the element of reflection in planning when they refer to reflection in the "preparatory phase" of learning activities.  Mezirow (1991) links cognitive development in adults to the outcome of reflective activities and the ability to act on the insights gained from them.  This appears to be consistent with Vygotsky’s concept of proximal development (in an adult application) using Doolittle’s (1995) relationship of development in response to co-operative learning activities.  Such a use of reflection in cognitive development, as is suggested by Mezirow (1991) and Doolittle (1995), places individuals in the mode of attending to cognitive development as a self-reflective (or internal) practice and this is supported by the ego development work of Hauser et al (1991) with families.

Figure 4.1 shows a diagrammatic representation of reflection types developed from the material of Boud et al (1985), Boud and Walker (1990), Schon (1983; 1987), Mezirow (1991) and Dick (pers comm).

 

Figure 4.1 Reflection types

It appears that there are two well recognised forms of reflection.  One occurs after the event and operates through conscious attention to a previous event - it is reflection-on-action.  The other is an unconscious or conscious act that takes place while the event is occurring - it is often termed reflection-in-action.  A third form has been referred to here as before-the-event reflection and relates to planning.  The reflection which I will be referring to in Section 4.6.2 will be reflection-on-action which directs conscious attention to a previous event and enables the ‘reflector’ to make sense of that situation, ex post facto.

 

Section 4.6.2 Positioning reflection in experiential learning and linking it to higher level learning

With reference to the dimensions of his experiential learning model, Kolb (1984 p58) argued that "The second is a transformational dimension, which includes two dialectically opposed modes of transforming experience, one via intentional reflection, the other via extensional action."

Intention in this model involves reflection on observations. Bawden (1990; 1995) has referred to the role of reflection on this dimension in discussing his proposition for attention to learning as a thrust to deal with complex problems.  However, he like Kolb (1984) and Wolfe and Kolb (1991), recognises the need to operate on both dimensions and in all four adaptive modes for situation improvement.  Kolb’s (1984) reasons that each mode is ‘equipotent’, that is they are each important to the emergence of learning.

Bawden (1990; 1995) has provided meaning for the role of reflection in experiential learning.  He uses the work of Maturana and Varela to remind us that the way we each see the world determines what we choose to attend to in the world.  From this perspective he has developed the suggestion that to be effective as experiential learners we each need to ‘address’ [reflect on] our style.  Addressing our style is understandable in terms of reflecting on how we each learn.  Such an expression bears similarities to Kitchener's (1983) discussion of the role of meta-cognition in monitoring cognitive tasks and amending them where warranted.

Boud and Walker (1990) place more emphasis on reflection than on other aspects of experiential learning.  They offer similar suggestions to Habermas (1973), Argyris et al (1985) and Schon (1983) in suggesting that reflection can offer insights into the foundations of the learners’ beliefs about themselves and the world, as well as the situation under scrutiny.  In a formal educational setting, Bish and Dick (1992) have developed a repertoire of reflection activities that provide for explicit attention by learners to what they are learning.  They have developed these through their own professional reflection.

Thus it seems that this group of authors differs from Kolb (1984) position of equipotency of learning modes in their preparedness to suggest that reflection may hold a position of particular importance in learning.  The material they present, provides for attention to reflection in two possible ways.  One relates to reflection as a general tool while the other is reflection in which the learner assumes a more critical position and considers their own role in the situation.  Kember et al (1997) argue that critical reflection provided a learning outcome of fresh insights at a personal level.  Similarly Bawden (1995) and Brookfield (1992;1995) support critical reflection for significant higher level learning or change in the development of theoretical positions on learning.

Vanclay and Lawrence (1995 p47) argue that the lack of reflection is a crucial aspect in their assessment of environmental practices.  They report that in the conventional productivity-based model of agriculture " ...  scientists and farmers ...  rarely question the productivity drive which underlies modern framing practice." The implication they make is that reflection, with or without its critical elements, is not occurring in this situation.  It is in complex situations of this nature that reflection in experiential learning could play an important role in learning from past farming experiences so that changes are persistent (Bawden 1995) and increasingly effective over the long run (Torbert 1983).

The addition of criticality to reflection provides for an extension to the types of reflection illustrated in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.2 shows the extended diagram.

 

Figure 4.2 Reflection types extended to include critical reflection

 

Section 4.6.3 Critical reflection

Critical reflection is a term referred to by a number of authors writing about reflection and learning.  They present it as the reflective situation in which the learner explores his or her own role in the situation.  Systems approaches need it, argues Ulrich (1993 p586) because "Moral judgment has been eliminated from our concepts of rationality as far as they are actually built into existent scientific and systems methodologies.  And yet it is the very task of ethics - more so than of any other kind of reflection and argumentation - to strive for a comprehensive justification of good and ‘right’ actions." Habermas (1973) is another for whom critical reflection is reflection into the role of the self in the situation.  In nursing education Burrows (1997) has reviewed literature to interpret the same personal emphasis on critical reflection in the particular field of facilitation.  Applied material to support such a conclusion is available from a managerial perspective from Sterman (1989 p338) who shows evidence of poor quality (non-critical) reflection producing poor decisions in organisational settings.  His claim of managers who failed in a simulation of inventory control activity is that "...  by attributing the source of change to external factors [external to themselves], people’s mental models led them away from the true source of the difficulty ... allowing dysfunctional (managerial) performance to persist." Critical reflection may well have a role at that level, as well as at that referred to by Ulrich (1993).

It is Habermas’ writing and his attention to emancipatory interests to whom a variety of authors refer as a philosophic source for their attention to critical reflection.  Examples are Kemmis (1996), Brookfield (1995; 1987), Bawden (1995; 1990), Ulrich (1993), Mezirow (1991), Carr and Kemmis (1986), Argyris et al (1985) and Boud et al (1985).

These authors also emphasise critical reflection and its link to higher level learning.  For Mezirow (1991) the link is through access to personal meaning perspectives.  For Argyris et al (1985) it is recognition of discrepancies between personal espoused theories and theories in use.  In the writings of Kemmis (1996) and Carr and Kemmis (1986) critical reflection provides for emancipation from distorted self-understandings.  Bawden’s (1995) version is the development of critical learning systems. For Ulrich (1993) it is a part of critical holism and critical heuristics to question personal perspectives.  For Brookfield (1987) it is critical questioning of personal assumptions and critical reflection on personal teaching practice (Brookfield 1995).

In a field of practical applications of critical reflection related to recovery processes Eastland (1994) submits that Habermas’ concepts of critical reflection are essential for the higher level learning needed for behavioural change.

Few of these authors however refer to the traumatic impact of critical reflection and the need for support for people undergoing critical reflection phases.  Brookfield (1994) is an exception here as he recognises the personal challenge which critical reflection presents, and highlights the way graduate programs encourage critical reflection.  From a phenomenographic study he presents the evidence of distress accompanying critical reflection for a group of adult educators.  He suggests that it is appropriate for those encouraging others to critically reflect, to themselves become critical learners about critical reflection.  He claims that in doing so they can act usefully and sympathetically with others in critical reflection.  Benefits are possible from the facilitation of critical reflection, through the facilitator participating in his/her own critical reflection while interacting with the others. The potential benefit comes from the sharing of the facilitator’s experiences as a means of modeling critical reflection and creating common ground for dialogue about critical reflection.

The traumatic impact of critical reflection and the difficulty of its application may offer a contributing reason why behaviour is usually difficult to change.  It may even explain Bunning’s (1996) observation that making time available for their own reflection is rejected by managers.

My interpretation of this literature is that critical reflection provides for individuals to explore their own role in problematic situations.  The literature provides a philosophical and a practical basis for this suggestion.  Critical reflection makes a significant contribution to higher level learning because it is reflection on the role of the self in the situation. However, critical reflection is personally challenging, and modeling critical reflection offers a beneficial role for a facilitator.  The literature referred to in Section 4.5 emphasised that individuals are influenced by their epistemic positions. Therefore, if critical reflection involves exploration (or inquiry) of individual/personal roles in situations, then the epistemic positions individuals hold may influence their ability to critically reflect.  In the next section I consider literature related to critical reflection and the epistemic positions of individuals.

 

Section 4.6.4 Critical reflection and an individual’s epistemic organisation

In Section 4.5 I presented cognitive development as related to a person’s epistemic abilities in cognitive processing (Kitchener 1983).  It appears that it may also influence an individual's abilities to critically reflect.  Alternatively, it may be that in affecting a person’s ability to reflect, cognitive processing may influence a person’s cognitive development.

Consideration of this can begin by reference to Kitchener’s (1983) condensing of Perry’s (1970) material to three positions of epistemic organisation.  They are duality, multiplicity and relativism.  In an epistemic organisation of dualism (Perry 1970) the elements are right and wrong only.  When right-wrong duality presents as ‘I (the reflector) am unquestionably right’ it appears that critical reflection and its questioning of underlying values and assumptions would be difficult.  Habermas’ (1979) definition of moral stages at the ‘preconventional level’ is similar to duality and provides additional understanding of the difficulty.  For Habermas it is again right or wrong, but also punishment and reward and satisfying one’s own needs before those of others, that predominate as epistemological assumptions.  The added understanding is that satisfying one’s own needs and avoiding punishment represent restrictions for learners trying to critically reflect.

Perry’s (1970) position of multiplistic epistemic organisation is one of acceptance of equal value for each individual’s opinion as an epistemology of practice.  This position also reduces the opportunity for developing a truly critically reflective stance insofar as the reflector assumes that his/her beliefs are as legitimate as any others.  On that basis questioning the role of self seems less necessary.  Habermas (1979) defines a similar position to multiplicity as the ‘conventional level’ where unquestioned conformity or loyalty to an individual's own expectations prevails.  At such a level it is difficult to envisage the reflector critically reflecting to question his/her ‘unquestionable expectations’ that are of ‘equal value’.

With an epistemically organised position of commitment in relativism (Perry 1970) however it appears that the situation changes to one where critical reflection becomes possible.  In this epistemic position, Perry (1970 p257) refers to "An affirmation of personal values or choice ...[through] ...  a process of orientation of self in a relative world." Later he classifies it as involving alternation between reflection and action. Perry’s attention to developing commitment through self-orientation in relation to personal values seems to be consistent with a concept of critical reflection that questions personal values.

Again the writings of Habermas (1979) support this. Habermas’ highest level of moral stages is the ‘principled level’.  He describes this as one where an effort is made to define moral values and principles that can claim external validity (validity that doesn’t come only from the authority of the group or persons holding the principles).  At the principled level validity is separate to the reflector’s own identification with these people or groups.  Like Perry (1970), Habermas (1979) draws attention to the role of individuals in developing a position about a situation to which they consider themselves contributing i.e.  in which their own role is considered or reflected upon.  It is this attention to their own values and principles that makes this position more likely to provide for critical reflection.

Reflection is the means whereby we can elucidate for action what Habermas (1973) has called technical, practical and emancipatory interests.  In doing so reflection to produce technical change or prudent action can be served by reflection that may not include self-exploration.  However, reflection for emancipation, that is critical reflection, is not possible without attention to reflection about the role of the self.

Argyris et al (1985), Argyris and Schon (1996) and Dick and Dalmau (1991;1992) propose that others can have a role to play in making an individual’s reflection possible.  They have developed activities to do this that identify incongruence in theories of action.  Brookfield (1992) also offers activities involving others to uncover assumptions through reflective practice using role plays, critical incident analysis and the like.  Schratz (1996) has used memory work as a collective research method to promote self-critical reflection.  This idea of involving others in our reflections as a means of dealing with the ‘self-delusory’ aspects of individual reflection, was recognised by Habermas (1973).  In Argyris and Schon’s (1996) terms, it deals with the incongruencies of our action theories. However, introducing others into the reflection creates a social dimension to reflection.  The social dimension requires attention to relationships (Bish and Dick 1992; Dick and Dalmau 1992) among reflectors and that aspect may affect the reflector’s (learner’s) ability to learn.  Reflection with others adds the dimension of interpersonal relationships.  For that reason the way individual’s mentally ‘construct’ their social relationships can influence learning.

To summarise this section on critical reflection, the literature suggests that a person's epistemic cognitive position mediates their ability to critically reflect upon a situation of their own.  A position akin to Perry’s (1970) commitment in relativism is one that appears to most readily support the suggested criticality.  As well, critical reflection is important in providing for higher level learning in situations where the aim is emancipation.  Bawden (1995) has developed the proposition from his consideration of learning and development theory that persistent development will follow from critical reflection. Finally, there is evidence that others can contribute to individual’s reflective capabilities through engaging with them in structured reflection processes.  But introducing others into the reflective activity adds the dynamic of relationships. Having others involved, is a potential counter to Habermas’ (1973) concern that self-reflection can be delusionary because of the possibility of an individual’s mental constructions being biased.  This will depend however on the authenticity of information being exchanged in the reflection.  I engage with literature related to the requirement for authenticity in the next section. 

 

Section 4.7 The requirement for authentic information in communication

In the previous sections of this chapter I developed the ideas:

• that learning can occur at higher levels;
• that higher level learning is desirable as it enables needed shifts in governing values; and
• that such change is accessible through reflection in experiential learning, but the reflection needs to be critical for emancipation and thus persistence of learning outcomes.

In Chapter 2 I defined action learning and referred to it as a social means of providing for reflection.  I reported on the recognition of the foundation of contemporary action learning in experiential learning (McGill and Beaty 1992; Anon 1995).  I also reported on action learning’s focus on action outcomes (Revans 1982a; McGill and Beaty 1992; Anon 1995).

In this section I focus on the need for the exchange of authentic or valid information in an action learning group.  In doing so I contextualise this concept in the field of agriculture and consider literature regarding the need for exchange of authentic information for successful communication.

The calls for agricultural approaches that enable change (of paradigm or higher level learning) are increasing.  In Section 4.4 I drew on the writing of Stubbs et al (1997), Vanclay and Lawrence (1995), Fitzhardinge (1994), Lawrence et al (1992) and Russell and Ison (1991) to argue for the inclusion of social elements in the development of new approaches to the complex problems of rangelands.  In an international context, Pretty and Chambers (1994) and Whyte (1991) refer to the need for a paradigm shift in agriculture generally and change processes in agricultural extension in particular.  The calls relating to Australian and international agriculture focus on engaging the farmers in the system in the identification of the problem issue, and in developing responses to it.  The envisaged role of extension officers requires them to use their technical skills in combination with the application of adult learning principles. They are expected to facilitate interactions between all participantsin the system (Campbell and Junor 1992) while contributing from their technical base.  An example of the concept in practice is presented by Peuse and Mmbaga (1987) in their process for a problem-solving workshop with farm groups.

The change being called for is one of having groups of extension officers or researchers working together with farmers and others in the system.  An impediment to this is the observation made by Horton (1991) and Scoones and Thompson (1993) that researchers tend to believe in the superiority of scientific over indigenous knowledge.  This leads them to assume a position of power in the choice of relevant knowledge rather than distribute the position amongst individuals determined by the context of the situation.  Grundy (1996) has recognised the influence of social power in determining learner direction in education settings. Martin (1995) reports on it for the Landcare movement, and Holt and Schoorl (1985) acknowledge its occurrence more broadly in the introduction of technology in agricultural settings.

Frisby et al (1997) and Martin and Woodhill (1995) discuss the effect of the power structures in a situation on who is enabled to participate in change.  Chisholm (1990)

has discussed this for educational situations where she observed a lack of symmetricality (democracy of power sharing) even in well-intentioned action research projects.  Frisby et al (1997 p24) recognise that collaboration in action researching does not of itself ‘equalise power’ and they support this with the words of a participant that demonstrate that at least initially in this case there was inequality - "I must admit that at times I did not understand what was being said or why things were being done in a certain way.  You have all these degrees and you work at a university, so I assumed you knew what to do. However, when I did get the nerve up to disagree, people seemed to listen to me which gave me the confidence to speak out again." Grundy (1996 p118) acknowledges a similar phenomenon when she observes that "‘Trust’ alone does not necessarily redistribute power", implying that practice must follow if redistribution is to occur.

Habermas’ (1984) philosophical perspective on communication is a useful basis for responding to issues of power distribution in agriculture and elsewhere.  His theory of communicative action suggests a requirement for valid information exchanges to enable understanding among participants.  He maintains that there are three requirements for validity of utterances, that is, what is said.  One is that the statement made is true.  A second is that the speech act is right with respect to the existing normative context, that is, the norms by which participants interact.  The third is that the manifest intention of the speaker is meant as expressed, that is, the speaker must make his/her intention clear.  Argyris and Schon (1996) agree that successful interactions require the exchange of valid information.  They refer in particular to the intention of the speaker, when citing the need for congruence between espoused theories and theories-in-use.

The arguments in this section suggest that where learning involves interaction between individuals, through action learning or reflection with others for example, the interactions require valid information for success.  Orlikowski and Yates (1994) have identified ‘genre repertoire’ as a recurring pattern of type and contents of communications that is specific to community groups or organisations.  They suggest that genre repertoire influences, and is influenced by, the communicative practices of those in a community or organisation.  Thus if genre repertoire involves the use of expressions that mask authentic communication, learning will be less easily achieved.

Habermas (1984) and Argyris and Schon (1996) posit that the type and contents of communications needs to be authentic for meaningful change to occur.  They also argue however, that in personally challenging or threatening situations, the very situations that appear to most need changing, patterns of communication (genre repertoire) occur that make change difficult because the communication lacks authenticity.  It seems that patterns of communication that develop in groups, communities or organisations can inhibit or foster learning and change.  Action learning to make explicit the role of individual’s in improving their situation may be limited by an inhibiting genre repertoire.

The theory of autopoietic systems provides another insight into the importance of exchanges of valid information for higher level learning and change.  Mingers (1995) suggests that the understanding that participants make of a communication is a

component of the communication and he identifies the other components as information (the contents) and utterance (what is said).  His interpretation of the theory of autopoiesis has the level of understanding either maintaining the communication among participants or limiting it.  This suggests communication itself acts to produce its own components, to make it on-going through having the communication understandable by others so that they can respond in a way that has meaning for the initiator.  Mingers describes this as a communication acting as a recursive recreation of itself.  I believe that valid information is foundational to beginning and maintaining a communication that delivers learning.

Argyris et al (1985) and Argyris and Schon (1996 p50) develop a similar perspective in their action science theory, arguing "... that theories-in-use tend to exert a contagion or mirroring effect ...".  Their concept suggests that where co-researchers practise theories-in-use of exchanging valid information, it encourages others to do so as well.  Doing so is modeling a desirable behaviour.  They further suggest that the desirable behaviour of offering valid information often does not happens.  They maintain that people in threatening situations (problematic situations for them) "...  typically act in ways that inhibit the generation of valid information and create self-sealing patterns of escalating error" (Argyris et al 1985 p61).  They draw attention to the fact that authentic communication is itself problematic in difficult or problematic situations.

The Dick and Dalmau (1991) model of an information chain (see Figure 4.3) illustrates how the mirroring of communication behaviour occurs as a flow of communication through the key components in exchanges.  Its components provide an interpretation of how the understanding that participants make of a communication (through the outcomes for and the beliefs, feelings and intentions of the communicators) is a component of the communication itself. Furthermore it illustrates how understanding as a component of communication influences the self-producing or autopoietic nature of communication.

 

Figure 4.3 The Information Chain (Dick and Dalmau 1991)

 

Dick and Dalmau (1991) believe that barriers to communication are common and must be overcome for exchanges of authentic information to occur.  They refer to problems of communication associated with the implicit rules under which we may each operate.  Dick and Dalmau (1992a) identify the "undiscussability" of some subjects as a barrier to successful communication.  Their work in organisational and professional development has led them to observe that it is "undiscussable" to reveal gaps we observe in what others say they believe and what is observable in what they do.  Another observation is that we do not discuss our own assumptions about the motives of others and our feelings towards them.

Mingers (1991 p330) recognises this in the work of Maturana arguing that "Although often ignored in discussions of language and meaning, in real conversations our mood or "emotioning" is an ever-present background to our use of language ...  [such that] what is said, may trigger in us changes of mood." This can be construed as support for the communication chain presented by Dick and Dalmau (1991) and the "undiscussability" of some subjects in our communications as well as highlighting the significance of emotions in communication.

The impact of emotions on our thinking is developed further by Goleman (1996).  He suggests the interplay of thoughts and feeling indicates as that the emotions matter for rationality and "In the dance of feelings and thought, the emotional faculty guides our moment-to-moment decisions, working hand-in-hand with the emotional mind enabling - or disabling - thought itself.  Likewise the thinking brain plays an executive role in our emotions (p28)." Like Mingers (1991), Goleman supports the recognition of the impact of emotions in communication as suggested by Dick and Dalmau (1991).  His material further explains why emotions contribute to the authenticity of communication.

Habermas (1973 p12) recognises communication difficulties.  He suggests the basis of such difficulties is in a "theory of systematically distorted communication".  This is similar to Dick’s and Dalmau’s (1992a) observation about implicit rules leading to undiscussability.  Argyris et al (1985) and Argyris and Schon (1996) suggest that the foundation of ideal communication is what they term Model II values.  These are valid information, free and informed choice, internal commitment to the choice and constant monitoring of its implementation.  I believe that Model II behaviours provide a foundation for authentic information exchange in communication.

The authors referred to in this section recognise the importance to communication of authenticity in information exchanges.  It is the exchange of information that provides the impetus for change as an outcome of a learning situation.  For an autopoietic communication system, that is, one that is self-generating and where authenticity is a component, self-generation of the communication to achieve learning outcomes would seem to be unachievable if some or all of the items of the information chain are undiscussable.

The notion that initiated my project activities recognised the important role of information exchange in communication to generate learning at a higher level that manifests as behavioural change.  The basis for this is also evident in the literature earlier in the chapter which recognises that higher level learning provides for change in governing values.  The literature highlights the role of level of learning in the transformation of an individual’s perspectives, thereby broadening the opportunities for improvement in problematic situations.  It is also apparent that change as an outcome of learning requires the exchange of authentic information.  The authenticity required relates to cognitive content as well as normative beliefs, feelings and intentions. 

 

Section 4.8 Summary

In Chapter 4 I drew on a range of literature to develop the following perspectives related to learning and experiential learning:

• knowing how to learn can provide self-directedness and the skill needed to enable change;
• there are at least three levels of learning and knowing how to learn at each level can be beneficial for initiating change in behaviour;
• experiential learning provides for learning at each level;
• higher level learning (learning level three) is desirable because it provides the context for relevant paradigmatic and methodological change and that is the learning I am considering when I refer to higher level learning;
• epistemic cognitive development influences learning outcomes in experiential learning and this suggests incorporation of experiential learning activities that promote cognitive development to an epistemology embracing relativism is relevant;
• criticality can be added to learning situations through attention to emancipatory learning;
• reflection is a particularly potent stage in learning;
• critical reflection enables learning through its attention to the role of the self in problematic situations;
• critical reflection can be traumatic and support, including modeling and dialogue about difficulty during the process, is beneficial;
• there is evidence that an individual’s epistemic position determines his or her ability to critically reflect, and engagement with others in structured reflection can experientially provide for epistemic development; and
• higher level learning is promoted by the exchange of valid information.

In Chapter 5 I begin with a summary of my learning outcomes relating to understanding experiential learning and its role in a critical learning system.  I refer to Argument I presented in Chapter 1.  From there I summarise the dialectical material from my field work that contributes to the argument that is the basis of the Chapter 5.

 

"The greatest challenge to the development of knowledge is the comfort of dogmatism - the security provided by unquestioned confidence in a statement of truth, or in a method for achieving truth - or even the shadow dogmatism of utter skepticism (for to be utterly skeptical is to dogmatically affirm that nothing can be known)." (David Kolb, in ‘Experiential Learning’ 1984 p108)

"Education is the great engine of personal development" (Nelson Mandela, in ‘Long Walk to Freedom’ 1994 p194)

 

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